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Effectiveness of Regulatory Interventions on Firm Behavior:  
a Randomized Field Experiment with E-commerce Firms1 
 
Eelko Huizingh2, Machiel Mulder3 
 




Economic regulators use a number of instruments to change the behavior of economic agents, 
but only limited evidence exists on the effectiveness of such regulatory interventions. We 
conduct a randomized field experiment to determine the effects of two interventions aimed at 
e-commerce firms by a regulatory authority in order to let these firms meet legal obligations 
regarding information disclosure to protect consumer interests. We measure the compliance 
behavior of e-commerce firms in both a treatment group and a control group before and after 
two interventions. The first regulatory intervention concerns sending personalized letters to 
firms (firm-specific guidance), whereas the second intervention includes a number of 
dedicated publications and presentations by the regulatory authority (industry guidance). We 
find that both of these interventions have hardly any effect, neither in the short term nor in the 
long term. We conclude that regulatory interventions in the form of providing only guidance 
on the legal rules to firms are not effective strategies to influence their behavior.     
 
JEL classification: D21, D83, K20, M38 
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1. Introduction  
 
Assessing the effectiveness of regulatory intervention becomes increasingly relevant in the 
public debate on regulation of economic activities. The liberalization of markets over the past 
decades has relaxed regulatory constraints on the one hand (Wölfl et al., 2009), but has also 
resulted in more regulatory overview and enforcement of regulatory rules meant to correct 
market failures resulting from market power, externalities and information asymmetries. This 
proliferation of regulatory intervention has led to a growing need for information about its 
effectiveness and efficiency (Niels and Van Dijk, 2008). In particular, concerns about the 
costs of regulation and the risk of inappropriate measures taken by regulators call for a 
continuing assessment of how effective regulators operate. Prominent examples of such 
assessments are the policy evaluation studies conducted by the OECD. In these studies, the 
impact of regulatory measures on the macro-economic performance of countries is analyzed 
(see e.g. Nicoletti et al., 2006). Information on the effectiveness of regulation can also be 
helpful in the debate on the legitimacy of regulatory intervention (Don et al., 2008). Another 
objective of regulation-effectiveness studies is to increase our understanding of which types 
of interventions are when effective strategies to reach regulatory goals. Stafford (2003), for 
instance, analyzes the effectiveness of different types of hazardous waste regulation and finds 
that mandatory pollution prevention programs do not affect compliance. Other examples of 
this type of studies are De Witte et al. (2010) who find that a light form of price regulation of 
water utilities is able to foster productivity in the drinking-water industry and Nosenzo et al. 
(2013) who find that fines are effective in deterring non-compliance with rules, while the 
effect of bonuses on compliance is weak. On the topic of rule compliance, Telle (2013) 
concludes that frequent auditing of firms raises their compliance with environmental 
regulations. In an earlier study, Teller (2009) finds that just the threat of inspection, measured 
by the predicted probability of inspections, reduces the probability of violation of 
environmental rules. 
Compared to the above interventions, information-related interventions constitute a mild 
form of regulatory intervention, as they aim to change actor behavior by just informing 
economic agents about the existence and contents of regulations. Limited previous research 
suggests such interventions to be promising. For example, Apesteguia et al. (2013) study rule 
compliance by individuals and analyze the effects of sending email messages to visitors of 
libraries based on the speed by which they return items to the library. They find that the email 
messages help to promote rule compliance, but the authors cannot exclude an alternative 
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explanation, that the email messages act as signals that the library cares about rule compliance 
which triggered the positive response. Iyer et al. (2010), in a study on regulatory compliance 
by firms, find that informing businesses by sending a letter about the enforcement strategies 
affects compliance. Communicating higher levels of detection raises compliance with the tax 
rules significantly. Both studies on information related interventions suggest that such 
interventions can be effective, and as they are mild and relatively easy to implement 
regulatory authorities may consider them attractive means to stimulate regulatory compliance.  
To further increase our understanding of the effectiveness of information-related 
interventions, we focus on two kinds of such interventions, one that is focused on individual 
firms and one that aims to inform an entire industry. Our research builds on Apesteguia et al. 
(2013) while it is directed at firms instead of individuals, which enables us to test whether 
their conclusions can be extended to businesses. It complements Iyer et al. (2010), who also 
study firms, as we focus on the different ways of distributing information on legal rules 
instead of different information on enforcement strategies.  
In this paper, we determine the effectiveness of two different regulatory interventions that 
intend to stimulate the compliance behavior of economic agents by increasing their awareness 
of legal obligations. More specifically, we analyze to what extent two regulatory interventions 
aimed at e-commerce firms by the Dutch Consumer Authority4 are effective short-term and 
long-term measures to enforce legal obligations on information disclosure. According to 
Dutch consumer law, e-commerce firms are obliged to present various types of information 
that could be useful for consumers in making decisions.  
Following recent research (e.g., Levitt et al., 2009; Iyer et al., 2010; Apesteguia et al., 
2013; Collins, 2013), we conduct a randomized field experiment involving four measurements 
in which we monitor the compliance with legal obligations by online shops. Using data from 
the Dutch Chamber of Commerce we first define two representative samples which are used 
as a treatment group and a control group. In the first intervention, each firm in the treatment 
group receives information on the legal obligations through a personalized letter sent by the 
Consumer Authority, while the firms in the control group do not receive such information. 
Before and after this intervention we monitor the compliance of both groups of firms. The 
second intervention concerns the Consumer Authority providing information on the legal 
obligations to all firms by means of a number of dedicated publications and presentations in 
                                                          
4
 During the period of research, the Consumer Authority merged with the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) and the Independent 
Regulator of Telecom and Post (OPTA) into the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). For reasons of convenience, we 
only speak of the Consumer Authority in this paper. 
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public media. Again, we monitor the compliance behavior of both groups before and after the 
intervention. 
At the baseline, about 10 to 25% of the online shops do not provide the legally required 
information on firm characteristics, transaction costs and the order process. Regarding two 
other aspects, the initial compliance of the online shops is even much worse: 60 to 70% do not 
provide the necessary information regarding the time window to reconsider a purchase and the 
payment process. With respect to the two regulatory interventions, we find that none of the 
interventions has a significant effect on firm behavior, neither in the short term nor in the long 
term. During the study period, firm compliance with the legal rules on information disclosure 
changed hardly, in spite of the interventions by the Consumer Authority.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of the 
regulation on information disclosure by e-commerce firms. In Section 3 we describe the field 
study, including the design of the randomized field experiment, the interventions, and the 
various measurements. Section 4 describes the data collection and the initial compliance of 
the online shops. Section 5 presents an overview of the effects of both interventions, while 
Section 6 concludes with the implications of our study and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Regulation of e-commerce 
 
Technological innovations in the telecommunication industry have had major effects on 
consumers and producers. One of these consequences is the rapid growth in business-to-
business and business-to-consumer e-commerce. The share of e-commerce in total turnover of 
industries was approximately 15% on average in the industrialized countries in 2012 (OECD, 
2013). E-commerce appears to have a significant impact on economic growth and trade 
(Terzi, 2011). Buying and selling goods and services through the internet have many 
advantages. Online shops give buyers access to global markets with a large variety in 
products, while sellers can use the internet for enlarging the geographical area of their market 
(Grandon et al., 2004). Hence, e-commerce reduces transactions costs and increases 
transparency about the supply of goods and services.   
A precondition for online shops to be a good alternative for consumers is that consumers 
can trust the information online shops provide about the characteristics of the merchandise, 
payment conditions, delivery process, privacy and security (Belanger et al., 2002; OECD, 
2011). Customers of web shops fully depend on the information in the web site, while 
customers of normal (physical) shops can gather information on the quality of products by 
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actually experiencing (e.g. seeing, hearing, feeling) products before making a purchase 
decision. Moreover, customers of physical shops can deduce the trustworthiness of the shop 
by visiting the shop and observing and talking to the seller, while the trustworthiness of an 
online shop is more difficult to assess. So, while consumers always have to deal with 
imperfect information regarding so-called experience goods and in particular credence goods 
(Rischkowsky and Döring, 2008), this information asymmetry is enlarged when buying such 
products online. The information asymmetry may result in several inefficiencies, such as 
consumers buying low-quality products or refraining from buying due to a lack of confidence. 
As online sellers have an interest in a positive attitude of customers regarding their 
merchandise, they have an incentive to provide information that may increase the 
trustworthiness of their shop. For the market for higher education, for instance, Mause (2010) 
finds that sellers have incentives to organize a quality-information system with the help of 
private-party intermediaries, making regulatory intervention to protect the buyers on this 
market unnecessary. This does not mean, however, that online sellers always have an 
incentive to be as informative as possible. Online sellers in particular have an incentive to 
choose that design of their web shop that maximizes consumer expenditures (Belanger et al., 
2002). So, regulatory intervention might be needed to realize full transparency in online 
consumer markets.   
Governments can chose from a number of options to reduce the information asymmetry, 
such as subsidizing private provision of product information, making the disclosure of product 
information legally obligatory, and protecting consumers against deceptive advertising by 
sellers (Mause, 2010). Regarding online shops registered in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
government has chosen to implement information-disclosure rules in consumer legislation. 
The Dutch consumer law stipulates online shops to provide information to customers 
regarding a number of key characteristics, including the contact details of the firm, the cost 
structure of purchases, the existence of a time window for reflection (to cancel a purchase), 
and the processes of ordering, paying and delivery (ACM, 2012). Maintaining these rules is 
delegated to the Consumer Authority. This authority regularly monitors whether firm’ 
behavior is in line with consumer law. If not, the Consumer Authority has the legal power to 
take punishment measures, including to hand out monetary penalties. The Consumer 
Authority uses several instruments to influence firm behavior. One of these instruments is 
submitting guidance, i.e. distributing information on the contents of legal rules, the necessity 
to obey such rules, and the possible legal consequences of non-compliance. In this paper, we 
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assess to what extent such instruments are effective in raising the compliance with 
information-disclosure rules of e-commerce firms. 
Note that improving the effectiveness of the enforcement of the legal rules on information 
disclosure does not necessarily imply that consumers will make better decisions. 
Psychological factors, as selective optimism, the endowment effect and bounded rationality, 
may cause that well-informed consumers make decisions which are not in their self-interest 
(Faure et al., 2011). The existence of these factors does, however, not imply that consumers 
do not benefit from measures which reduce the information asymmetry in consumers markets. 
Hence, searching for effective regulatory measures to reduce the information asymmetry 
might increase the welfare of consumers, even if they behave less rationally as is generally 
assumed in economic models. 
 
3. Method of effectiveness measurement 
 
3.1 Field experiment 
The effectiveness of regulatory interventions can be measured by a number of methods. 
Bergman (2008) distinguishes qualitative studies, such as peer reviews, customer-satisfaction 
surveys and event studies, and quantitative studies, such as econometric studies on micro level 
or macro level. Each of these studies consists of an ex post analysis, trying to estimate the 
effect of past interventions on past events. A critical component of such studies is the 
definition of the counterfactual development, i.e. the development when the regulatory 
intervention would not have occurred. One way to account for counterfactual development is 
to conduct studies in which the circumstances affecting firm behavior are controlled. 
Experiments, both laboratory and field experiments, are therefore becoming more popular in 
economic research as they enable researchers to assess, for instance, the impact of a specific 
regulatory measure on firm behavior, holding all other factors equal (Levitt et al., 2009).  
In a laboratory experiment, Nosenzo et al. (2013) for instance, analyze the impact of fines 
as well as bonuses on compliance. Although laboratory experiments can be helpful in 
analyzing the impact of specific interventions, the results of such an experiment cannot 
directly be translated into daily policy because of the constructed character of the experiment. 
An advantage of field experiments compared to laboratory experiments is that the former 
combines the advantages of a controlled laboratory experiment with realism as it works with 
real-life agents not knowing that they are subject to economic analysis. Field experiments are 
increasingly used to assess the impact of regulatory interventions. Collins (2013) analyzed the 
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impact of a mandatory financial education program on financial behavior of low-income 
families which were randomly assigned to a treatment group or a control group. Iyer et al. 
(2010) applied randomized field experiments to assess the effects of different enforcement 
strategies on compliance with tax rules.  Another example is Apesteguia et al. (2013), who 
used randomized field experiments to analyze the effects of sending email messages to 
visitors of libraries on the speed by which they return the items to the library. 
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of two regulatory interventions by 
conducting a field experiment similar to Collins (2013), Apestiguia et al. (2013) and Iyer et al. 
(2010). Below we first describe the design of the experiment, with a treatment and control 
group and various before and after measurements, followed by a discussion of the 
measurements and how these are converted into indexes. 
 
3.2 Experimental design 
The goal of this study is to determine to what extent two Consumer Authority interventions 
are effective in enforcing the legal obligations on information disclosure by e-commerce 
firms. The research design reflects a randomized field experiment in which the interventions 
are considered as treatments, and web shops are randomly assigned to a treatment group and a 
control group. The first treatment, a firm-specific guidance, entails a personalized letter to the 
legal owner of the web shop in which the Consumer Authority stipulates the need for 
compliance with the legal framework and informs the owner about possible legal 
consequences of non-compliance. The firm-specific guidance concerns a personalized letter 
that is sent to the firms in the treatment group only. The second treatment, the industry 
guidance, is directed at all web shops in this industry and entails a range of Consumer 
Authority activities, including dedicated publications, press releases, presentations,  
distribution of check-lists, and journal articles (see Table 1). As the industry guidance is 












Contents of two types of guidance given by the Consumer Authority 
Intervention Type Action by the Consumer Authority 
Firm-specific 
guidance 
• Letters send to each firm of the treatment group to inform 
them about the legal rules, the obligation to meet these rules 
and the ability of the regulator to give firms a fine if they do 
not apply with these rules. 
Industry guidance • Publication of a document about the legal rules including 
links to a website of the regulator illustrating the information 
web shops should include.  
• Press release about the document and the regulator’s 
website. Several major Dutch newspapers published this 
information. 
• A number of agencies, including the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Office of Tax Collectors, as well as representative 
bodies of (web-shop) firms placed a link on their website to 
the website of the Consumer Authority.  
• Consumer Authority representatives gave a number of 
presentations about the guidance and distributed check-lists 
during the annual web-shop days in Utrecht. 
• Consumer Authority representatives used Twitter and other 
public media to spread information about the guidance. 
• Launch of free-publicity campaign, which resulted in a 
number of news items in periodicals of representative 













The data in this study reflect the extent to what web shops disclose information according 
to legal obligations. The data are collected for both the treatment and control group of web 
shops at four points in time (see Figure 1): 
t=0: before sending the firm-specific guidance to the treatment group. 
t=1: after sending the firm-specific guidance to the treatment group. 
t=2: before distributing the industry guidance. 
t=3: after distributing the industry guidance. 
 
Fig. 1 The research design involving two groups, two treatments and four measurements. 
 
 
The intervals between the various measurements are set to offer web shops sufficient time 
to respond to the treatments by changing their website. The firm-specific guidance was sent to 
the web shops on the next day after finalizing the t=0 measurement, the t=1 measurement took 
place one month after the firm-specific guidance, the t=2 measurement was done 
approximately 1.5 months after the t=1 measurement (which is 2.5 months after the firm-
specific guidance), while the t=3 measurement took place two months after the industry 
guidance. 
This research design enables testing of the following three effects: (a) the short-term effect 
of the firm-specific guidance (difference between measurements 0 and 1), (b) the long-term 
effect of the firm-specific guidance (difference between 0 and 2) and (c) the effect of the 
industry guidance (difference between 2 and 3). 
The advantages of our research design include avoidance of non-compliance and self-
report bias (Collins, 2013), since we observe whether information is available on a website. 
The observations are unobtrusive as the web shops are not informed about the measurements. 
The design does suffer from attrition, which is common in longitudinal research, as several 
websites disappeared during our study period or ceased to be a web shop. The data are 
collected by visiting each website to determine the availability of information elements by 
applying a detailed data-collection instrument (see Section 3.3). To avoid the problem of 
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inter-rater differences, the observations for all websites and at all time periods are done by the 
same researcher, who was first trained in using the data-collection instrument.  
 
3.3 Compliance measurements 
The data-collection instrument to measure the level of compliance is based on the legal 
framework that identifies 19 information items that should be available in a website. For each 
of these items, we developed an operational definition to turn the item into an observable 
website characteristic. The definitions are developed in collaboration with the Consumer 
Authority, who also approved the final data-collection instrument. The legal framework not 
only refers to the availability of an item, it also addresses the way as well as the place this 
element is implemented in a website. For example, the legal framework requires websites to 
be specific in referring to an item. With regard to shipping costs, the link or button to this item 
should be clearly mentioned as e.g. ‘Shipping’ or ‘Delivery costs’, and not be general such as 
‘Terms and Conditions’. The items also need to be easily found by consumers. In this 
example, consumers should not have to click on several subsequent links before they finally 
find the information on shipping costs. Therefore, the data collection instrument measures 
each information item on three dimensions: 
• Content: does the website contain the item? 
• Presentation: is the item presented clearly? (e.g., not as part of a large block of text or as 
fine print). 
• Place: from the legal framework, we derived the right place in the website for each item 
and measure whether it is available at that place. 
Each of these three characteristics is measured in a binary form: the web shop either 
complies with the legal rule or it does not. Compliance is coded as 1, non-compliance as 0. By 
aggregating over the three characteristics, we compute a compliance index, which reflects the 
percentage to which a web shop complies with the legal rules for an item (between 0 and 
100%).5 By using these observations, an index (Item index) is computed that reflects the 
percentage of web shops complying with the three characteristics of content, presentation and 
place: 
 
                                                          
5
 In several cases a characteristic cannot be measured, e.g. when a website does not contain an item (Content = 0). As it is impossible to 
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                         (1) 
 
 
In this formula i stands for items (1..19), d for the dimensions Content, Presentation and 
Place, w for web shops (1…W), while N refers to the existence of an observation (its sum 
represents the number of non-missing observations), and M to the measurement outcome (0 or 
1). Hence, by this formula we have a score for each item for the total group of W web shops. 
The lowest possible index value is zero, indicating that no web shop complies on any of three 
dimensions. If all web shops would fully comply on all three dimensions, the value is 1 which 
is the maximum value of this index. 
Similar to the computation of the Item Index, we also compute a Category Index. For that 
purpose, the 19 items are grouped into the following six categories: 
1. Firm characteristics: e.g., firm name, registration number and address (5 items). 
2. Additional Costs: e.g., taxes, and delivery (3 items). 
3. Reflection period: e.g., whether it is offered and of sufficient duration (4 items). 
4. Order process: e.g., overview of stages and products ordered (4 items). 
5. Payment process: timing and deadline (2 items). 
6. Delivery process: delivery method (1 item). 
The formula for calculating the Category Index is: 
 
		 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 

∑ ∑ ∑ 
                     (2) 
 
In this formula c refers to the category, which consists of a number of items (i=c…C). All 
tables in the next sections report percentages in terms of either the Item Index or the Category 
Index. We use the scores on these indices to assess the effectiveness of the guidance given by 
the Consumer Authority. 
 
4. Data collection 
 
This section first describes the sampling method, i.e. the selection of the web shops for the 
treatment group and the control group. Next, we provide an overview of both groups, in terms 
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of background statistics and the extent of initial compliance, that is, the extent to which the 
web shops comply with legal rules before the interventions took place. 
 
4.1 Sampling 
We conduct our analysis on the industry that exploits web shops specialized in selling 
cloths and luxury articles. Regarding consumer online purchases, this industry is one of the 
most important online industries in the Netherlands. A recent report identifies this industry as 
being the largest in terms of online sales after Telecom subscriptions (HBD, 2013). Total 
2012 sales are estimated at 730 million euro, up 16% from 2011, and up 500% compared to 
2004. The sampling frame consists of all 916 web shops registered in this industry at the 
Dutch Chamber of Commerce on September 11, 2012. This group represents the population 
of this type of firms in the Netherlands.  
The Chamber of Commerce data is used to sample both the treatment group and the control 
group. Both samples are randomly selected and compared with each other and the sampling 
frame in terms of age, legal status and geographical region. Age is considered to be important 
as web shops are a relatively new phenomenon, growing rapidly in numbers, with a 50% 
increase between 2010 and 2012 (Thuiswinkel.org, 2013)6, but having a low survival rate, 
reportedly only 41% after four years (HVA, 2013)7. 
Determining the right sample size involves making the trade-off between statistical and 
practical considerations. According statistical considerations, the sample size depends on the 
standard deviation (σ) of the sampling variable (in this case Age8), the means of both the 
sampling frame (µ) and the sample (X), and the required confidence level (z). Taking into 
account the limited size of the sample framework (N), the minimum sample size (n) can be 






                             (3) 
 
Practical considerations refer to the efforts and costs of data collection, and the fact that 
this study involves two groups (two samples) and four measurements for each web shop. 
Therefore we randomly selected 150 firms for both the treatment group and the control group, 






 Divided into six age classes: 0 to 1.5 years, 1.5 to 3 years, 3 to 4.5 year, 4.5 to 6 years, 6 to 7.5 years and 7.5 and more years.  
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based on the age of the firm and formula (1), which results in a confidence level of 92%. 
Next, we checked whether the firms selected from the Chamber of Commerce actually 
represent active web shops, by visiting each of the 300 website addresses. A considerable 
proportion of the web shops listed in the database turned out to be unavailable, 31.7% of the 
300 web shops. Therefore, we randomly added additional firms to both samples and checked 
these websites, until we reached 150 observable web shops for both the treatment group and 
the control group. 
 
4.2 Background characteristics 
To describe the treatment and the control group and to test whether the samples are also 
representative for other characteristics, we examine the distribution in both groups regarding 
legal status and geographical region (being the two characteristics available in the Chamber of 
Commerce database). Table 2 shows that the total sample (300 web shops) is comparable to 
the population in terms of age, legal status and region (chi-square tests, p>.05). Similar results 







Characteristics of population, sample, treatment group and control group (in %) 
Characteristic Population Sample Treatment group Control group 
Age (year):     
       < 1.5  19.5 19.7 21.3 18.0 
  1.5 – 3 24.3 27.0 26.7 27.3 
  3    – 4.5 18.7 19.0 21.3 16.7 
  4.5 – 6 17.7 17.7 18.7 16.7 
  6    - 7.5 8.1 7.7 4.7 10.7 
        > 7.5 11.7 9.0 7.3 10.7 
        Total 100 100 100 100 
Legal status:     
  Sole-trader business 84.0 82.3 85.3 79.3 
  Partnership 12.0 14.0 12.0 16.0 
  Other 4.0 3.7 2.7 4.7 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
Geographical region:      
  Zuid-Holland 17.1 17.7 18.0 17.3 
  Noord-Holland 15.5 18.7 16.7 20.7 
  Noord-Brabant 12.9 12.7 14.7 10.7 
  Gelderland 12.2 12.7 11.3 14.0 
  Overijssel 8.7 6.0 5.3 6.7 
  Utrecht 8.1 9.7 10.7 8.7 
  Drenthe 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.7 
  Flevoland 4.9 3.0 2.7 3.3 
  Groningen 4.8 4.0 4.7 3.3 
  Friesland 4.1 5.0 4.7 5.3 
  Limburg 4.1 5.0 5.3 4.7 
  Zeeland 2.4 1.3 2.0 0.7 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
Note: Chi-square tests show that the sample is similar to the population and the treatment 
group to the control group on all three characteristics (p>.05).  
 
 
4.3 Initial compliance 
The first analysis focuses on the initial compliance of the web shops in both the treatment 
and control group (at t=0). Table 3 shows that about 75 to 85% of the web shops score well on 
the requirements regarding the categories Firm characteristics, Additional costs, and Order 
process, while almost all firms fulfil the requirements regarding the Delivery process. As a 
consequence, except for the delivery process, non-compliance is not extensive but still 






Results for the initial measurement (t=0), for both the treatment and control group (index in 
%) 
Category/Item Index Treatment group Control group 
Firm characteristics 85.3    88.9    
  Firm name 93.1    91.3 
  Registration number  65.1    71.3 
  Address in real world 64.4    69.1   
  E-mail address 68.0    79.6 * 
  Direct contact possibility 88.0    94.7 * 
Additional Costs 76.1    75.9 
  Taxes 58.9    59.3 
  Delivery costs 82.9    85.3 
  Other unavoidable costs  83.3    83.3 
Reflection period  30.4    31.8 
  Period for reflection 32.2    35.8 
  Duration of at least 7 days 60.7    53.9 
  Why reflection not relevant 2.0      0.0 
  Reference to legal exemption 2.0      0.0 
Order process  78.7    79.2 
  Overview process stages 53.1    55.3 
  Option to reconsider 0.4     0.0 
  Overview ordered products 100   98.0 
  Option to change order 82.0   84.0 
Payment process 41.3   35.9 
  Before/after delivery 42.0   36.4 
  Deadline after delivery 50.0   25.0 
Delivery process  99.3   99.3 
  Delivery method  99.3   99.3 
Note: * refers to a significant difference between the treatment and control group (p<.05) 
 
 
With respect to the other two categories, compliance is much worse. No more than 30% of 
the web shops provide the appropriate information regarding the Reflection period, while only 
41% gives sufficient information on the Payment process. Overall, these findings suggest 
ample room for improvement, which supports the idea of interventions by the Consumer 
Authority. 
A t-test is used to compare the treatment group with the control group. Out of the 25 tests 
(19 items and 6 categories), only two differences are statistically significant. In both cases it 
concerns an item index for which the control group mean is higher than the mean for the 






This section discusses the findings with regard to (a) the short-term effects of the firm-
specific guidance, which is the effect after 1 month, (b) the long-term effect of the firm-
specific guidance, which is the effect after 2.5 months, and (c) the effects of the industry 
guidance.  
 
5. 1 Effects of firm-specific guidance 
The first two columns in Table 4 show the short-term effect of the firm-specific guidance, 
being the difference between the measurements at t=0 and t=1.  We test whether the changes 
in both groups are different (t-test). Assuming the firm-specific guidance has an effect, we 
may expect larger positive changes in the treatment group than in the control group. 
Regarding the short-term effects, the treatment group does slightly better in t=1 compared to 
t=0 in terms of category indexes, though the largest increase is still only 3%.  Compared to 
the control group, the treatment group shows a significantly larger increase in terms of one 
category index, namely Additional costs. Regarding the 19 item indexes, for only one of them 
(Overview of the process stages) we find a significantly larger increase for the treatment 
group. Overall, however, we find that the short-term effect of the firm-specific guidance is not 















(Difference t=1 and t=0) 
Long-term effect 
(Difference t=2 and t=0) 
Treatment group Control group Treatment group Control group 
Firm characteristics  1.3  1.1  1.9 -0.0 
  Firm name  0.2  3.4  1.0 3.6 
  Registration number   4.3  0.5  5.2  -4.3 * 
  Address in real world  4.8  0.0  4.0 0.7 
  E-mail address -1.0  0.5  3.0  -2.1 * 
  Direct contact possibility  2.2  0.7  2.2 1.4 
Additional Costs  1.5    -1.0 *  1.7 0.0 
  Taxes  1.9 -1.8  0.8 0.7 
  Delivery costs  1.9 -0.9  3.2 -0.2 
  Other unavoidable costs   n.a.  0.0  n.a 0.0 
Reflection period  -0.4 -2.0 -0.5 0.8 
  Period for reflection -0.5 -2.0  0.0 -0.2 
  Duration of at least 7 days  7.6  3.1  4.8 4.7 
  Why reflection not relevant -1.2  0.0 -1.2 1.2 
  Reference to legal  
  exemption 
-1.2  0.0 -1.2 1.2 
Order process   3.4  2.4 3.6   1.1 * 
  Overview process stages  11.0     2.7 * 10.0  -1.4 * 
  Option to reconsider  6.7  7.5 11.4 8.5 
  Overview ordered products  0.0  1.4 0.0    2.1 * 
  Option to change order  2.9  2.0  1.5 -2.1 
Payment process  1.9  4.5 -0.2 1.5 
  Before/after delivery  1.9  5.0  0.0 1.7 
  Deadline after delivery  0.0 -25.0  0.0 0.0 
Delivery process   0.0   0.7  0.0 0.7 
  Delivery method   0.0   0.7  0.0 0.7 
Note: * significant difference between the Treatment and the Control group (5%, t-test, one-
tailed); n.a. = not available. 
 
The long-term effects of the firm-specific guidance are displayed in the last two columns 
of Table 4. Again, the absolute changes for the treatment group are most often small, in terms 
of category indexes all changes for this group are in the range of -0.5% and 3.6%. Only one 
category index shows a significant difference between both groups (Order process). We find 
a few more significant differences between both groups when considering the item indexes. 
Four differences are significant, three of them in the expected direction, with the treatment 
group outperforming the control group. These are Registration number, Email address, and 
Overview order process stages. Surprisingly, the control group shows a significantly larger 
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increase in terms of the item index Overview ordered products. Overall, again, we observe not 
much difference in performance between both groups, meaning that the long-term effect of 
the firm-specific guidance is also minimal. 
 
5.2 Effects of industry guidance 
 In order to determine the impact of the industry guidance, we cannot analyze the 
differences between the treatment group and the control group as this guidance is provided to 
all firms (see Table 1). Therefore, we analyze changes in behavior over time for both groups. 
Panel analysis enables us to determine the change in compliance between t=2 and t=3 by 
controlling for other factors which may influence firm behavior, including the firm-specific 
guidance given to firms in the treatment group. The panel analysis is conducted at the level of 
the category indexes. Note that controlling for other factors was not needed in our previous 
analyses as the firms in the treatment group and the control group have similar characteristics 
while operating in the same environment.  
We estimate the effect of the industry guidance by using a dummy: this dummy is set equal 
to 1 for all observations at t=3, and 0 for all observations at previous time periods. We include 
a dummy to control for the influence of the firm-specific guidance: this dummy equals 1 for 
all observations of the firms in the treatment group, and 0 for the control group. In addition, 
we control for the age and the legal status of the web shops by including these variables 
directly as well as by including the interaction terms between these variables and the dummies 
for the firm-specific and industry guidance. The latter is done because older firms and firms 
with a formal legal position may show better compliance with legal obligations. We include 
the legal status by a dummy which is 0 for firms which are a sole-trader business and 1 for all 
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constant  0.86 *** 
(0.02) 
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 0.25 *** 
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Trend  0.004    
(0.003) 








 0.002  
(0.001) 
Note: between brackets the standard error; *, ** and *** refer to significance levels of 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that the industry guidance dummy has no significant effect on the 
compliance with legal rules by the web shops. For all indexes, the dummy coefficients are 
statistically not different from zero. The panel analysis also shows that the firm-specific 
                                                          
9
 The total number of observations is less than 1200 (300 firms x 4 measurements), as some web shops which were included at t=0 did not 
exist anymore at one or more of the following measurements. If we restrict the panel analysis to those web shops that are present in all four 
measurements, we find similar results. 
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guidance has neither a significant effect on the compliance, thereby confirming the previous 
analyses.  
In one case (Payment process), the age of the web shops has a positive influence on 
compliance. This implies that older web shops comply to a larger extent with legal obligations 
with respect to information on this category. In another case (Order process), the age of the 
web fosters the compliance after the industry guidance. The results also show that the legal 
status has some effect on compliance. Firms with a more formal legal status (not being a 
‘sole-trader business’) seem to comply better with the legal rules. In addition, we find that the 
performance of the web shops improves slightly over time, given the consistently positive 
coefficient of the trend, albeit this coefficient is only significant in one case (Order process). 
This is also shown by the constants of the panel regressions which are almost equal to the 
average values of the dependent variables at t=0 (see Table 3), this again highlights that the 




Consumer markets are known to be vulnerable for problems of information asymmetry, 
resulting in inefficient market outcomes. This holds in particular for online consumer markets 
due to the limited opportunities to experience merchandise before making a purchase 
decision. Because of this market failure, governments may implement a number of regulatory 
measures, including legal obligations regarding information disclosure. The effectiveness of 
such obligations depends on the strength of enforcement.  
In this paper we assess the effectiveness of enforcing the legal obligations on online shops 
by two regulatory interventions, each informing online shops in a different way about the 
content and importance of legal obligations. The firm-specific guidance concerns sending 
personalized letters to firms, the industry guidance includes a number of dedicated 
publications and presentations by the regulatory authority. A randomized field experiment 
allowed us to determine the effectiveness of both interventions by defining a treatment group 
that received the personalized letter and a control group consisting of firms that did not 
receive a letter. Compliance with the legal rules by both groups is monitored at the baseline, 
i.e. before the first intervention, as well as at three different moments later on, allowing 
assessment of both short term and long term effects. 
We find that both the firm-specific guidance and the industry guidance have hardly any 
effect on compliance behavior neither in the short term nor in the long term. We conclude that 
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regulatory interventions in the form of providing only guidance to firms are not effective 
strategies to influence their behavior. Firms do not seem to change their behavior in response 
to just receiving more information on legal obligations. Although the letter, which was 
personalized and sent by the Consumer Authority to each firm in the treatment group, 
mentions the legal power of the authority to fine non-complying firms, this threat is 
apparently not strong enough to have firms adapt their behavior.  
This result differs from Apesteguia et al. (2013) who concluded that sending email 
messages with information regarding rules helps to promote compliance. One possible reason 
for the marked differences in intervention effectiveness is related to differences in the 
economic agents (firms versus individuals), since firms may make a more rational analysis of 
the expected costs of violating rules (Telle, 2009; 2013). More research is, however, needed 
to explain the absence of almost any effect of the information interventions aimed at firm 
compliance. Further research could focus on the reasons why economic agents do not comply. 
As one of the interventions included a personalized letter to the firm, not being aware of the 
legal obligations cannot explain non-compliance behavior in our study. A more in depth 
understanding of non-compliance behavior will help regulatory authorities in designing 
effective interventions.  
Based on our findings, we formulate the following implications for regulatory authorities. 
First, although regulatory authorities need to inform economic agents about legal obligations, 
they also need to realize that just informing economic agents may be insufficient to change 
their behavior. In addition to communicating the legal obligations and the regulator’s ability 
to fine, more serious regulatory threats are needed in order to have a significant influence on 
firm behavior (Iyer et al., 2013). Second, regulatory authorities may consider more creative 
interventions that could be effective as they have important consequences for the economic 
agents. For example, the regulatory authority in our study may consider involving consumer-
advocate organizations and even individual consumers in interventions. Consumer advocate 
organizations could report scores (rankings) of firms complying with a varying extent to legal 
obligations (for example by using our measurement model), while consumers could adjust 
their purchase behavior in response to such information. The resulting bad publicity and 
missing sales may be effective in changing firm behavior. Such an intervention can be 
effective as the experience of the Dutch drinking-water industry shows. Publicizing data on 




Third, research into the effectiveness of government interventions may benefit from 
adopting our randomized field experimental design. Following and extending previous 
effectiveness studies based on field experiments (e.g., Apesteguia et al., 2013; Collins, 2013; 
Iyer et al., 2013), we have shown that such a design is a powerful, accurate and realistic way 
to study how effective interventions are. The distinction between a treatment and control 
group allows researchers to control for changes in the environment that are beyond control of 
the researcher but that could affect intervention effectiveness. 
Although regulatory interventions are found in many situations and in many forms, we still 
lack knowledge with regard to their effectiveness and efficiency (Niels and Van Dijk, 2008). 
This paper provides clear evidence that at least not all interventions are effective. Both 
information-related interventions were ineffective in changing the behavior of economic 
agents. In combination with the importance of regulatory interventions for national economic 
policies and the current lack of understanding of their effectiveness, more field research is 
needed to explore this issue.   
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